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  Daniel Putman
Abstract
Epicureans distinguish natural desires, which have their origin
in the body itself, from empty desires which are imposed by
society. Natural desires allow a person to enjoy pleasures free
from anxiety and worry. Empty desires such as those for
status or luxury are endless and lead to a life of frustration,
resentment and anxiety. In this paper I apply this distinction
to musical experience and differentiate between the genuine
enjoyment of music and musical experience tainted by empty
desires.
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1. Epicurus on Desire
Ataraxia, or freedom from disturbance, was a central concern
of ethical schools after Aristotle. For the Skeptics it was
achieved by using reason against itself to eliminate beliefs.
Beliefs constantly need defending, make contrary beliefs
difficult to tolerate, and generate anxiety about uncertain
futures.[1] The Skeptics argued it was best to have as few
beliefs as possible. For the Stoics, unlike the Skeptics, reason
was a positive path to a life of peace and happiness, but at the
price of eliminating or controlling passions and desires as
much as possible. We are always free to choose our responses
to the world and the world need never disturb us. By
controlling our desires, reason can preserve our freedom to
choose wisely.[2]
The Epicureans took a somewhat different path to ataraxia.
Epicurus argued that the problem is not desires or beliefs per
se but the distortion of desires caused by false beliefs. Desires
are not alien to being human, and achieving pleasure in the
right way can facilitate a life of tranquility.[3] The problem lies
in the fact that most often we attempt to fulfill desires in the
wrong way. Why? Because of the myths, stories, expectations
and superstitions handed down by society. A simple meal,
eaten slowly and with good friends, can be enormously
satisfying and a treasured memory. On the other hand, a meal
based on society's expectations of eating at the "right
restaurant" in the "right city" while being seen with the "right
people" is part of a false set of beliefs in which the genuine
pleasures of food and friendship get buried under socially
imposed expectations. This behavior can become an endless
cycle, in the sense that with such beliefs we are always
chasing the fads of society in a fruitless search for a happiness
that does not exist. It can also become a habit, so much so
that many adults may forget how to enjoy the true pleasures
of life. For the Epicureans, ataraxia means eliminating false
beliefs from our consciousness and enjoying the genuine
pleasures of being human.
In his analysis of desire and pleasure, Epicurus distinguished

"natural desires" from "empty desires." Natural desires have
the body as their source. Some are necessary for survival -- a
positive one being the desire for food and a negative one
being the desire to avoid pain. Other natural desires involve
our social nature, or friendship, for example. Some desires are
natural but not necessary, e.g., eating expensive food at plush
banquets. Epicurus recommended that we not pursue such
pleasures, but that, if they occur, we should enjoy them for
what they are. But there is another type of desire. These
"empty desires" are natural desires twisted and exaggerated
by society.[4] Epicureans were fond of blaming three sources
in particular for empty desires: love stories, stories that glorify
wealth and luxuries, and stories about the gods and
immortality, all which are the source of much anxiety and
suffering in the world. When a desire becomes tied to one of
these distorted and false stories, no possible source of
satisfaction exists because the focal point of the body's
experience has given way to delusional beliefs which can
never be satisfied. We can never lead the perfect life the gods
want or have all the luxuries which we are told we need to be
happy. Natural desires can be regained and a life of ataraxia
achieved by eliminating these false beliefs from our
consciousness.
2. Music and Desires
This Epicurean analysis has much to say for it. It certainly
seems to fit well into a society where advertising always
preaches the need for the next luxury around the corner and
where so many people rich in having their desires fulfilled
seem to be hostile, resentful and anything but "ataraxic." But
what does this have to do with musical experience? I believe it
applies in several ways and makes some sense of how and
why people enjoy or do not enjoy music. Though little if
anything about music is extant in the Epicurean literature, it
seems reasonable to assume that music for the Epicureans
would be a natural desire. Music seems analogous to
friendship, one of those natural desires which integrate the
mind and body in a more transcendent moment of pleasure.
Cicero quotes Epicurus as saying that part of what he defines
by "good" is "listening to songs."[5] Given the assumption of
the enjoyment of music as a natural desire, I want to explore
two issues in this paper. The first is whether the natural-empty
distinction taken at face value is useful for the analysis of
musical experience. Second, I want to examine briefly whether
Epicurus is in fact right that the natural-empty distinction is a
real distinction and what that might tell us about the
enjoyment of music.
One obvious application of the natural-empty distinction is
when music is utilized directly as an adjunct in order to
support false beliefs. When music is used in advertising, for
example, it serves a particularly insidious role from an
Epicurean perspective. The fragments we have concerning
Epicurus clearly indicate that pleasant memories are a
fundamental part of life's enjoyment. Music has a way of
staying with us long after the auditory experience ends. Empty
desires concerning status, love or luxury that prevent us from
experiencing genuine pleasure become heavily reinforced when
music becomes associated with the false belief. So an
automobile, which may be entirely comfortable in itself and

satisfactory as a utility for achieving other natural pleasures
such as family trips, becomes instead a status symbol. The
desire for that status is then reinforced with that music, music
specifically designed to get you to remember and act upon the
false belief. Long after the details of the ad have gone from
memory, the music for that ad will be associated in your mind
with the need to show off a higher status in society. Feeling
frustrated or inadequate because one's status is not high
enough is an endless cycle. Someone will always be "above"
you and, when attached to material objects like cars, the
desire can bankrupt a life both financially and emotionally.
This empty desire is strengthened considerably by the music
associated with it.[6]
But I think the distinction runs deeper than that. Consider the
genuine enjoyment of a piece of music, a symphony, for
example. As discussed a great deal in the literature since Kant,
music allows us in a unique way to explore our emotional
landscape. How and why that occurs is subject to much
debate and I will look at two such theories later in the
paper.[7] Regardless of how it happens, the experience of
music is a natural desire humans have around the world. The
pleasure is natural from an Epicurean perspective in that only
two factors are involved: the music and the individual. The
relationship is direct -- Beethoven's Fifth and my emotional
reaction, with no intervening social myths to distort the
experience. It might be inferred, then, that music that
produced direct violent or emotional upheaval in a person
would be ideal. But the difference between Epicurean and
Cyrenaic hedonism was that, for Epicurus, natural desires
included use of the psyche. Those who advocate violent or
disturbing emotional experiences fail to consider that
pleasures mediated through the mind are more long-lasting,
less likely to have painful consequences and "deeper" in the
sense of staying with one positively throughout a longer span
of life.[8]
But then what happens when great music becomes part of
society's expectations? A concert can become a place to be
seen. Certain music becomes integrated with the story of
wealth and success in people's minds and attending a concert
may become a symbol of such success. The empty desire for
status can get in the way of the natural desire to enjoy the
music. The whole experience can become what the Epicureans
would call a "disturbance of the soul," in which anxiety
replaces contentment. Clearly this does not always happen to
concert-goers. But the Epicurean point is that the more the
empty desire of social expectations dominates the experience,
the less sheer enjoyment the music will provide. Our
consciousness may be divided between the natural desire to
enjoy the music and the empty desire of proving our status by
showing that, after all, we do appreciate great music.
Meanwhile, we may in fact hardly hear the music in other than
the most superficial way. We have lost a chance to experience
one of the deepest and most long-lasting pleasures in life. To
an Epicurean, for whom life is far too short and there is no
afterlife, wasting time at that concert trapped by empty
desires is a personal tragedy.
Another type of empty desire common to aesthetic experience
is the desire to figure out what we are supposed to feel from

music. This is empty not because it is endless, but because it
intellectualizes the experience too much, becoming a filter that
blocks the pleasure of the music. One learns to associate
certain music with certain emotions, possibly because of
previous listening experiences or because of what society tells
us to expect. Listen to a piece of music enough and emotional
ruts start to form. Be too concerned about what the artistic
elite is saying about a piece of music and the mind can
channel the musical experience into a personal test case of
one's aesthetic skills. From an Epicurean standpoint, we need
to eliminate from consciousness beliefs or expectations that
filter or distort the pleasure of the music. While there is
nothing necessarily problematic in associating certain emotions
with music, the attempt to "match" the music in front of us to
a preconceived idea or expectation can divorce the natural
desire of the body to enjoy music from the music itself.
3. Desire and Theories of Musical Expression
The distortion of judgment brought on by empty desires can
help clarify theories of musical expression. One such theory is
that music expresses emotions that are designed to be
aroused in the listener. Consider a nonmusical example first.
Imagine your friend says "thank you" for a gift given her. How
your friend says those two words means everything. They can
connote appreciation, satire, bitterness or anger. The two
words alone tell us very little. What you need to be able to do
is to "read" the tone of voice in order to understand what your
friend is actually saying, and then to have the appropriate
emotional response to the expression. Imagine that your
friend's "thank you" is satirical -- a biting way of saying "I am
disappointed in you." But because you have just given your
friend a gift that society says is all the rage and your head is
filled with an image of yourself as the model gift giver, you
either never hear what your friend is really saying or you gloss
over it quickly and read the tone of voice as you want to hear
it. An important moment of communication in a friendship is
lost because, as Epicurus might say, your mind has been filled
with a delusional belief about what brings happiness.
In this theory of musical expression the final movement of
Tchaikovsky's Pathetique Symphony is designed to arouse in
us an emotion like grief or sadness. The aesthetic moment is
lost if we cannot respond to what the composer intends
because we are distracted by some empty desire. Perhaps we
are pondering what we now know about Tchaikovsky's love life
and what society thinks of that, or perhaps we are pondering
future conversations about the symphony and how erudite we
can sound. In both cases we do not listen to the music itself
and fail to experience the emotions intended to be aroused by
the music. We may as well have not heard it at all -something your friend might also say to you about your
response to her words.
The arousal theory of music has been roundly criticized for
several reasons. Without going into detail on this much
discussed issue, two such criticisms are worth noting. One,
first put forward by Hanslick, is that for much, perhaps most
music, there is no general agreement about what constitutes
the proper emotion to be aroused.[9] So, if for A the last
movement of the Pathetique arouses a feeling of noble

heroism in the face of tragic and unavoidable circumstances,
while for B it arouses a deep sense of despair and total
hopelessness, who is right? A second significant criticism is
the implication of the arousal theory that music that does not
arouse emotion is failed music. Thus music significantly
different from what we are used to and which leaves people
"cold" would be an aesthetic failure. Such an a priori judgment
seems out of place. The natural-empty distinction is useful
only to the extent that the theory itself is accurate.
So let's consider another theory of musical expressiveness and
apply the Epicurean distinction. Kivy's "physiognomy" theory
claims that music is not designed to arouse emotions, but that
our experience of music is a function of our perception of
it.[10] His famous example is the face of a St. Bernard. It
makes no sense to say that the St. Bernard is sad (he may be
quite happy as dogs go) or to say that the St. Bernard's face
is designed to arouse an emotion like sadness in us (he likely
wants lunch). Yet it still does make sense to say that the St.
Bernard's face is sad. What do we mean by that? The analogy
with friendship may be helpful again. Sometimes, as in the
friend example given earlier, the friend really does intend to
arouse a clear emotion in us, and we need to get our
delusions out of the way to be open to that. Other times, we
may read a friend's expression even if that friend is not at all
communicating with us directly or intending anything. Perhaps
we see her in an unguarded moment and recognize an emotion
that is haunting the person.
This ability to project our emotional understanding to people
around us gets generalized to other sights and sounds. Willows
"weep" and the song of a wren is "bright" or "happy." In many
nonhuman cases the projection of emotion is pure
anthropomorphizing and is simply inaccurate (and we usually
know that). But this animation of perception, as Kivy calls it,
applies equally to music.[11] Music stands somewhere
between the friend and the willow. With the friend in the
unguarded moment, we assume, based on experience, that
she probably really does have the emotion we sense (perhaps
sadness). With the tree we assume it does not. But with music
we do not assume the music (or the composer while writing it)
somehow "has" the emotion. Clearly the notes do not have it,
and no one knows what the composer was feeling while
composing it. Nevertheless, the musical form strikes us as
having a certain emotional configuration which we recognize
and which had something to do with a human agent who
structured the music in a certain way. Our reading of the
music is neither a pure anthropomorphic projection nor is it
based on the assumption that the music or composer
somehow is (or was) sad. This "middle knowledge" on emotion
is perhaps what gives us the aesthetic distance needed to
enjoy the beauty of a piece like Gorecki's sad and tragic Third
Symphony. It is not anthropomorphic nonsense to say the
music is expressive of sadness, yet our recognition of sadness
without ourselves becoming consumed by it allows us to enjoy
the aesthetic moment.
The natural-empty distinction applies here in this sense.
Empty desires can alter our perception of what is in front of
us. One possibility is that empty desires (e.g. obsessions)
distort and distract our perception to the point where we fail to

recognize the musical pattern. Who can hear joyful music
when one is obsessed by envy or jealousy? Another type of
example is very close to one Epicurus himself would have
used. Imagine we are told by society what great art music is,
i.e. it must have a certain musical form. If it does not have
that form, then whatever else it is, it is of limited or no
aesthetic value. We then happen to hear jazz for the first
time. Our perception, distorted by society's stories, is limited
by the belief that this cannot be great music and it is not even
worth trying to understand. In the arousal theory, empty
desires block our experience of the proper emotion. Here
empty desires distort our perception. Natural desires,
understood to be an unmediated interest in appreciating and
enjoying music as it is given, allow us to hear (or sincerely try
to hear) the potential emotional richness of musical
expressiveness beyond our own limited experience. Empty
desires, whatever their source, can block and distort our
perception of that musical landscape.
4. Are There "Natural" Desires?
This aesthetic application of the natural-empty distinction
assumes that the distinction itself is accurate. But is it?
Epicurus assumed that all natural desires spring from desires
of the body (including the psyche), and include social desires
like friendship and virtues like justice. (His view of justice is
distinctly egoistic.[12]) Unlike Aristotle, he did not accept the
premise that the polis is central in shaping who we are as
individuals, i.e., that the individual would not exist were it not
for the stories of our culture and society. Yet Epicurus himself
emphasized a resocializing of the individual, not an
abandonment of society. The Garden, the school founded by
Epicurus, was designed to do just such resocializing. The
Garden was intended to be a retraining school for students in
which the teachers were definitely the authorities. In fact, the
Garden, noted for its radical openness to all classes and both
genders, also appears to have been quite close to what we
would call today a cult.[13] Epicurus talked about the child's
experiences being the model. Yet neither he nor any other
Epicurean would opt for the child's tendency toward immediate
sensory satisfaction. What they really wanted was the child's
direct simplicity and emotional honesty filtered through the
wisdom of the adult mind. No adult becomes an adult without
being socialized, and those who are poorly or minimally
socialized are not the Epicurean ideal. Friendship takes
patience and understanding, as does listening to a symphony.
A Cyrenaic would have no time to waste learning to appreciate
Stravinsky; a strong drink would be far more pleasurable.
Epicurus wanted a wisdom provided by a different form of
socialization. Thus the concept of "natural desires" is
inherently vague.
But does the fact that desires are socialized destroy the
usefulness of the natural-empty distinction for clarifying
musical experience? I think not. Rather than "natural"
necessarily being put in opposition to society, the distinction
can be maintained by having "natural" refer primarily to the
pleasure of the subject at hand (music, friendship, food) and
"empty" refer to desires extraneous to that subject. The issue
has more to do with focus than with society per se; indeed,
focusing involving memory and repetition, was a big part of

the re-education that occurred in the Garden.[14] Given what
occurred in the Garden, the real Epicurean problem with love
stories, tales of wealth and luxury, and religious mythology is
not that they are socially inculcated into individuals (which
process Epicurus himself was doing), but that they are
delusional and unrealistic. This is the real Epicurean insight
about aesthetics. Empty desires divert attention from genuine
aesthetic pleasures toward an ideal of pleasure that cannot be
fulfilled: the classic case is concern over being admitted to the
club called the artworld.[15] In music, what empty desires do
is superimpose some delusional, nonmusical element on our
experience. A desire for status distorts the musical experience,
not because society is blocking a supposedly pure,
uncorrupted experience of the body, but rather because one
element of society, which is unrelated to the music and which
can never in principle be satisfied, imposes itself between the
listener and the music.
If we redefine "empty" as extraneous or irrelevant to the
pleasure at hand, then we need to distinguish further between
a desire that may be justified and one that is truly unrealistic.
A person can be distracted from music by a sudden concern
that one's child in the next room is coughing. In the spirit of
Epicurus, this is hardly an empty desire but a case in which
one natural desire (for the child's health) trumps another one
(the desire to enjoy music). It is entirely different and
completely in the spirit of Epicurus to reserve "empty" for
those desires over which we have no control or which by
themselves cannot possibly be fulfilled. Thus, obsessing about
how one did on the exam yesterday or whether I am going to
get my name in the paper by going to the concert would be
empty desires. In the first example of the exam, the Stoics
would say it is empty because the event is over and done
with. Since it is over, why let something you have no control
over dictate your thoughts? Maintain your freedom. The
Epicureans would say it is empty because it is both a desire
that (being in the past) cannot be fulfilled by one's actions and
because it prevents us from enjoying the pleasure in front of
us. The second example about one's self-image is more purely
Epicurean, in that the nature of the desire itself (fame) is one
that cannot in principle ever be completely satisfied. If we
emphasize "empty" not as being socially imposed per se but as
delusional or impossible to fulfill, we can allow socialization its
proper role and still maintain the natural-empty distinction as
aesthetically useful.
Contrary to the view that society today is too hedonistic, the
Epicureans would say it is not hedonistic enough.
Contemporary society blocks and distorts genuine pleasures by
filling people's heads with stories and expectations that lead to
anxiety, inadequacy and resentment because the desires can
never be satisfied. The Epicureans would argue that the arts
today hide other social agendas -- profit being the main one -behind a veil of immediate pleasure-seeking. It pays in cash to
create in the general public empty desires that need endless
attempts at fulfillment. Epicurus, the pleasure-seeker, would
be a huge critic of this so-called pleasure-oriented society,
whose members so often do not know how to enjoy the simple
pleasures of life. We have more pleasures in front of us,
including musical pleasures, than any other culture in history,
yet for many of us, how little time we take to be completely

present to the joys of being alive.
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